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LAW, TERRITORY, AND SOVEREIGNTY:
SOME ISSUES RAISED BY THE CORPORATE
CONTROL OF LAND
JOSHUA BARKAN∗
PROVOCATION
In late fall of 2008, during the final days of the George W. Bush
administration, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) released a series of
maps designating over 100,000 acres of land to be leased to oil and gas
companies in rural Utah. The designations were based on Resource
Management Plans (RMPs) conducted by the Utah State Office of the BLM
(BLM-Utah).1 As the product of an administration led by oilmen who had
advocated reforms to federal lands policies promoting fossil fuel
development the land leasing program was, to say the least, controversial.
Even more so in that the lands slated for auction abutted protected areas
including Arches and Canyonlands National Parks and Dinosaur National
Monument. The controversy only increased when, during the auction on
December 19, 2008, Tim DeChristopher, a 27-year old activist and student
at the University of Utah, entered the BLM office in Salt Lake City and
proceeded to bid on the newly available lands. DeChristopher won over $1.7
million in oil and gas leases, before being charged on two felony accounts of
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violating the 1987 Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act2 and
issuing false statements.3 After numerous delays, DeChristopher was
brought to trial and convicted in March 2011, ultimately serving 21 months
in federal prison.4
The auction and DeChristopher’s activism received widespread media
attention and have become central to debates concerning strategies for
climate activists.5 They have also inspired other environmentalists to
intervene in BLM auctions for leases, most directly Terry Tempest Williams
and Brooke Williams’s attempts to purchase BLM land up for auction in
Utah by creating a corporation (the Tempest Exploration Company, LLC)
and legally participating in the leasing process.6 What interests me about
these events, however, is less the moment or even potential of civil
disobedience than how we understand and analyze the routinized practices
of public land management to which these acts of civil disobedience call
attention. For instance, in rejecting the Tempest Exploration Company’s
noncompetitive lease application, Edwin Roberson, Director of BLM-Utah,
highlighted Tempest Williams’s writings and advocacy work with the Keep
It in the Ground movement as indicating her company’s intentions not to
comply with “the diligent development requirement plainly set forth in your
noncompetitive lease offers.”7 This suggests that the BLM leasing program
is not simply set up to enable private companies to produce oil and gas, but
actively demands leasees to demonstrate their commitment, diligence, and
intentions to do so. This is in spite of the fact that many public lands already
leased to oil and gas companies are not ultimately used for production.
Roberson and BLM-Utah thus seem to be drawing a tenuous distinction,
based on the intentions of oil and gas companies,8 between valid leases of
2. 30 U.S.C. § 195 (2012) [Hereinafter 1987 Reform Act.].
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). For an account of these events, see OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: BLM UTAH LEASE SALE (2009).
4. See INVESTIGATIVE REPORT supra note 3.
5. For a smattering of the reportage, see Utah Activist Disrupts Sale of Leases for Drilling, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008; Kirk Johnson, Legal Cost of Throwing a Monkey Wrench, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2009; Umbra Fisk, Climate Activist Tim DeChristopher Talks about His Guilty Verdict, THE GUARDIAN,
Mar. 11, 2011; Abe Streep, The Trials of Bidder 70, OUTSIDE, Oct. 27, 2011.
6. For her own account of the process, see Terry Tempest Williams, Keeping My Fossil Fuels in
the Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2016.
7. Letter from Edwin Roberson, State Director, Utah BLM, US Dept. of Interior, to Terry Tempest
Williams, Tempest Exploration Co. (Oct. 18, 2016) (available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3146518/Terry-Tempest-Williams-Letter.pdf).
8. Id. As Roberson’s letter stated, “Viewed objectively and in their totality, your express
statements to date show intent to not diligently explore for and produce the oil and gas resources
underlying the two lease parcels for which you have submitted noncompetitive lease offers.” Id.
Moreover, in gleaning intentions from Tempest-Williams’s writing, Roberson conflates TempestWilliams’s statements as an individual with the intentions of her company, Tempest Exploration. Id.
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lands that are undeveloped due to concerns about profitability versus invalid
leases of lands that are undeveloped out of a different vision of resource
extraction, production, and use.
QUESTIONS OF ANALYSIS
How then do we analyze this conjuncture concerning the leasing of
public land for corporate-led resource extraction and development? Much of
our understanding of the role of corporations in the use of public lands is
highly specific, historical, and contextual. Accordingly, we might begin with
the proximate political context in order to grasp the conflicts over oil and gas
leases in Utah. To be sure, as already noted, the vicissitudes of federal policy
did seem to shape the decisions on which parcels of land were put up for sale
and when. Following the disrupted auction, a temporary injunction on the
BLM leases was issued in a U.S. District Court9 and, in February 2009,
incoming Interior Secretary Ken Salazar initiated a special review of the
December 19th auction.10 The final report suggested problems with the speed
by which lands were brought to auction and the process of soliciting input
from the National Parks Service and other stakeholders, including
environmental groups.11 In response, Salazar voided the sales. The fact that
the Trump administration seems interested in returning these lands back to
market12 bolsters the notion that this is a story of contemporary political
conflict between business-friendly Republicans and Democratic
environmentalists.
Although such a story is plausible, particularly in relations to the
controversial sales in Utah, it fails to account for the much larger consensus
on corporate-led resource development as a fundamental principle of U.S.
public land law. Certainly the Obama administration’s reprieve on the Utah
leases was a victory for conservationists, but conservationists have also
noted that the aggregate record of the Obama administration on public land
resource development was mixed and far from the radical departure from
existing practices of resource development and public land management that
environmentalists desired.13 Moreover, the legal framework enabling the
9. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Allred, No. 08-2187, 2009 WL 765882, at *3 (D.
D.C. Jan. 17, 2009)
10. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL BLM REVIEW OF 77 OIL AND GAS LEASE PARCELS OFFERED IN
BLM-UTAH’S DECEMBER 2008 LEASE SALE (2009).
11. Id.
12. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3354, SUPPORTING AND IMPROVING THE
FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM AND FEDERAL SOLID MINERAL LEASING
PROGRAM (2017).
13. See Jessica Goad & Christy Goldfuss, President Obama Needs To Establish A Conservation
Legacy In Addition To A Drilling Legacy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 10, 2013), available at
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transfer of public lands to private companies was not a new creation of the
George W. Bush administration. As the charges against DeChristopher
make clear, the current leasing system for public lands is based on the abovementioned 1987 Reform Act, itself a law updating and amending the 1920
Mineral Leasing Act (MLA).14
Historian Paul Sabin has argued that the 1920 MLA emerged at a
moment of transition between two property regimes on public lands. Prior to
the 1920 Act, resource development on public lands was a component of a
broader commitment by both the federal government and states and localities
to using an array of state powers to promote settlement, agriculture, and
economic development.15 Sabin has characterized the period as one of “free
mining” in which policy promoted fee simple transfers of land to individuals,
a system that was codified in the General Mining Act of 1872.16 Although
the 1920 Act was meant to create a stronger national system of land controls,
Sabin has shown the pivotal role of the oil industry in structuring the
legislation.17 The leasing system created by the MLA ended the practice of
easy land sales and had the potential to raise revenues for the federal
government. However, it was less a departure from the free mining period
than a “reorganization of land and development rights” that, through the new
leasing system, “protected most corporate claims to the public oil lands.”18
Much the same could be said for the 1987 Reform Act, which did not seek a
total overhaul of public lands policies in relation to resource development as
much as it attempted to increase revenues by transforming the noncompetitive aspects of the leasing process.19 As such, the 1987 Reform Act
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2013/01/10/49105/president-obama-needs-toestablish-a-conservation-legacy-in-addition-to-a-drilling-legacy/.
14. Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-260 (1987)
(the session law of the 1987 Reform Act); INVESTIGATIVE REPORT supra note 3.
15. PAUL SABIN, CRUDE POLITICS: THE CALIFORNIA OIL MARKET, 1900-1940 16 (2005). Sabin
notes that states and the federal government “distributed land, corporate charters, tax exemptions, rights
to levy tolls and dam streams, and other benefits” as part of this project of development through the
promotion of private property. My own account of this property regime, focused on the granting of
corporate charters, is in Chapter 2 of CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GOVERNMENT UNDER
CAPITALISM (2013). Much of this research harkens back to classic work in U.S. legal history, from the
commonwealth studies of the 1950s to the work of scholars such as J. Willard Hurst, Harry Scheiber, and
Charles McCurdy. See generally JAMES HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1956); Harry Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the
“Commonwealth” Policy in Nineteenth Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135 (1972); Harry
Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217 (1984).
16. SABIN, CRUDE POLITICS, supra note 13, at 17.
17. Id. at 4-5.
18. Id. at 41.
19. Prior to the 1987 Reform Act, leases were issued on a non-competitive first-come, first-served
basis, except for lands with a “known geological structure” (KGS) which went through a competitive
bidding process. Lacking the scientific resources to establish whether or not lands held significant
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maintained the commitment to the broader use of public lands for resource
extraction, while also attempting to foster a competitive market in the
distribution of lands. For this reason, Abraham Haspel, at that time Chief
Economist at the Department of Energy, referred to the 1987 Reform Act as
“a modest victory for the marketplace and competition.”20
These continuities in public land policies on resource development
suggest the need to situate the contemporary policies of public land use
within a broader framework than one focused solely on the shifting politics
of competing federal administrations. One framework, prominent across the
social sciences, has been to view the leasing of public land as a form of
privatization and a component of a more extensive process of
neoliberalization. A now wide-ranging and somewhat unwieldy literature,
neoliberalization has been used to describe predominantly two interrelated
phenomena. The first refers to a set of policy proscriptions and regulatory
practices, including privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and
attacks on labor protections and the social welfare state, aimed at easing the
geographical mobility of capital as it scours the earth looking for profitable
investments.21 This analysis of neoliberalization locates the emergence and
adoption of neoliberal policies in a variety of jurisdictions as a response to a
series of systemic crises within the capitalist world system beginning in the
1970s.22 The second, closely connected with the first, involves a more
generalized form of governmental rationality in which individuals, states,
and society more broadly are subjected to a range of new techniques and
practices of knowledge production and information gathering, which are in
turn intended to foster “efficient” and “entrepreneurial” forms of selfgovernment.23 Whether considered as a policy project or a form of

reserves of oil and gas, the vast majority of lands lacked the KGS designation and were thus leased in a
non-competitive process. The Reform Act eliminated the KGS designation, subjecting all leases to a first
run of competitive bidding, before turning over non-claimed lands to a first-come, first-serve leasing
process. See Patricia J. Beneke, The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987: A
Legislative History and Analysis, 4 J. MIN. L. & POL’Y 11, 13–15 (1988).
20. Abraham E. Haspel, Drilling for Dollars: The New and Improved Federal Oil Lease Program,
13 REG. 62, 62 (1990).
21. For a classic summation of this approach, emphasizing the class dimensions of the neoliberal
project, see generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005). See also Jamie
Peck & Adam Tickell, Neoliberalizing Space, 34 ANTIPODE 380 (2002). For the legal dimensions of
policy transfers, see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES
(William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 2002).
22. See generally HARVEY, supra note 18.
23. On this dimension of neoliberalism, see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF
BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1978-1979 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham
Burchell trans., 2008); Wendy Larner, Neo-liberalism: Politics, Ideology, Governmentality, 63 STUD.
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governmental rationality, both conceptualizations of neoliberalization are
united in the elevation of the market as a model for and mode of social
discipline and regulation.24 Scholars are also quick to note that, far from
seamless, both neoliberal policies and forms of knowledge and subjectivity
are riven by internal failures and contradictions, as neoliberal commitments
to market-based governmental practices rely on and deploy multiple forms
of state power and violence.25
Arguments about neoliberalization have had particular purchase in
explaining changing approaches to land and resources. In cases ranging from
the enclosures of lands and oceans to the privatization of drinking water to
the rise of economic frameworks and metrics to deal with environmental
issues such as ecosystems services, carbon emissions, or biodiversity,
neoliberal policies and practices have been viewed by critical social
scientists as key elements in contemporary transformations in the
conceptualization and use of natural resources, as well as the political and
ecological consequences of these new regimes.26 Moreover, one of the great
benefits of neoliberalization as a conceptual framework is the way it can
explain and synthesize empirically diverse cases concerning the corporate
control of land. Thus events as distinct as privatization within U.S. public
land policies, massive land-grabs for agricultural production and the revival
of plantation economies in many places across the global South, and the rise
of export processing zones and other enclaves associated with trade
liberalization can all be considered within a broader historical account about
the transformations in contemporary capitalist social relations.27

POL. ECON. 5 (2000); WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION
(2015).
24. Here, too, there is a stylized historical account of the origins of neoliberalism within a “thought
collective” running from the German ordoliberals to the Austrian and, later, Chicago Schools of
Economics. See generally PHILIP MIROWSKI & DIETER PLEHWE, THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE
MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009). On
the uneasy and contradictory ways corporations are presented in these models of market-based
government, See Joshua Barkan, Corporate Power and Neoliberalism, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF
NEOLIBERALISM (Damien Cahill et al. eds., 2018).
25. See generally HARVEY, supra note 18; Peck, supra note 18; DEZALAY, supra note 18;
FOUCAULT, supra note 20; Larner, supra note 20; BROWN, supra note 20.
26. See generally NEOLIBERAL ENVIRONMENTS: FALSE PROMISES AND UNNATURAL
CONSEQUENCES (Nik Heynen, James McCarthy, Scott Prudham, & Paul Robbins eds., 2007) (for
collected essays). On the application of economics to biodiversity, See generally JESSICA DEMPSEY,
ENTERPRISING NATURE: ECONOMICS, MARKETS, AND FINANCE IN GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY POLITICS
(2016). On neoliberalism and the biopolitics of oil in the United States, See generally MATHEW T. HUBER,
LIFEBLOOD: OIL, FREEDOM AND THE FORCES OF CAPITAL (2013).
27. See generally, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, EXPULSIONS: BRUTALITY AND COMPLEXITY IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2014); Nancy L. Peluso & Christian Lund, New Frontiers of Land Control, 38 J.
PEASANT STUD. 667 (2011).
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The 1987 Reform Act is readily legible in terms of neoliberalism. A
transformation of an old mining law that sought to create a more efficient
distribution of land and a more productive system of extraction through the
creation of a competitive market for oil and gas leases, the 1987 Reform Act
has all of the hallmarks of the neoliberalization of nature. In addition, a
narrative about neoliberalization also helps us to make sense of the harsh
sentence DeChristopher received, as his activism subverted the central
mechanism of market-based government that structures the current leasing
system.
However, the notion that corporate land enclosures are relatively recent
phenomena of post-1970s political and economic transformations obscures
some of the important continuities in the ways law has promoted the
corporate control of land. This, of course, is not only true in terms of the
BLM leasing program but also holds for many of the most worrying
corporate acquisitions of land across the globe. As White et al. note, “[m]ost
regions of the global South, as well as the global North, have a long history
of land ‘grabbing’ on a large scale.”28 Recognizing as much, White et al.
suggest that the global phenomena of contemporary corporate land deals is
structured by “six trends which promote various mechanisms of
accumulation through land investment, some of which repeat historical
manoeuvers from the colonial handbook while others involve new
configurations of old relations.”29 These trends make up less a theory of
corporate land control than a “contextual” account of the dynamics shaping
a process playing out in a variety of locations within the global political
economy.30 White et al. attend primarily to the disparate effects of these new
enclosures in terms of the changes they bring to agrarian relations, such as
the conditions of work, systems of land tenure, and patterns of food
provisioning, a focus consonant with much of the theoretically sophisticated
and empirically expansive work on corporate land deals coming from
agrarian and development studies.31

28. Ben White, et al., The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals 39 J.
OF PEASANT STUD. 619, 619 (2012).

29. Id. at 627.
30. Id. at 629. The six trends include: the anticipation of 1) food and 2) fuel insecurity, 3) the
emergence of new environmental imperatives of conservation, 4) the incorporation of peri-urban areas
into Special Economic Zones, 5) the creation of new financial instruments, and 6) the promotion of largescale land investments by international multilateral institutions. Id. at 627−30.
31. See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 24; Special Issue: The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on
Corporate Land Deals, 39 J. OF PEASANT STUD. 619 (Ben White et al. eds., 2012); Special Issue:
Governing Global Land Deals: the Role of the State in the Rush for Land 44 DEV. & CHANGE 189 (Wendy
Wolford et al. eds. 2013).
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The ways corporations are empowered to enclose, control, manage, and
govern land is equally important for understanding some basic questions
about the relations between law and society and the role of land and territory
in legal concepts of sovereignty, state power, and justice. For instance, to
return to the case of the BLM oil and gas leases, perspectives focused on
either the proximate historical context of the end of the Bush administration
or the broader dynamics of neoliberalism present the routinized selling off
of public lands to extractive industries as a usurpation of public goods for
private interests. It is this framework that subtends the aforementioned
dashed hopes of environmentalists for transformational progressive
change.32 However, if the general trajectory of public land law has long been
linked to promoting corporate control of land under a vision of capitalist
development, the present is less an aberration than a continuation of the
territorial dynamics of older practices of corporate sovereignty. Furthermore,
such a perspective raises profound questions about the limits of law to
address practices of enclosure that are foundational to liberal legality within
capitalist regimes.
Studying these relations between law, territory, and sovereignty thus
requires attention to the longer history of corporate enclosure, and useful
precedents exist for such inquiries. For instance, foundational text in legal
history – from J. Willard Hurst’s monumental account of the legal
foundations of the Wisconsin lumber industry to E.P. Thompson’s history of
the emergence of property rights over Windsor Forest to Morton Horwitz’s
elaboration of the origins of instrumental conceptions of law – all focused,
to various degrees, on the control of land as central to the ways law organizes
society.33 Likewise, legal historian Christopher Tomlins has more recently
suggested that colonization offers a new metanarrative for U.S. legal
history.34 For Tomlins, this in part means attending to longer historical
trajectories of U.S. law that stretch into the colonial period, while also
focusing on the legal dimensions of territorial expansion. These works not
only provide both theoretical and methodological resources that could

32. See Goad, supra note 11; Michael Klare, How Obama Became the Oil President, MOTHER
JONES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/09/how-obama-became-oilpresident-gas-fracking-drill/.
33. See J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER
INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836-1915 (1964); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF
THE BLACK ACT (1975); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977).
34. See Christopher Tomlins, American Legal History in Retrospect and Prospect, 28 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 1135, 1142 (2003); Christopher Tomlins, In the Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse
of English Colonizing, and the Refusal of American History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 451, 453
(2003).
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contribute greatly to our understanding of the ways law facilitates corporate
enclosures.35 They also allow us a framework to consider the ways such
processes stretch into the contemporary period, as colonial forms of legality
continue to structure the thought and practice of liberal law, not only in the
creation of state territoriality, but also in privatized forms of enclosure.

35. For a theoretical elaboration of Hurst’s conception of the legal constitution of capitalism, see
William Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: the Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst,
18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 98 (2000).

